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CHAPTER ONE 
YEMEN BETWEEN REVOLUTION 
AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 
Sheila Carapico 
YEMEN'S LAYERED AND COMPLEX dialectics pit twenty-first-century 
optimism against twentieth-century cynicism. A struggle is unfolding 
between, on the one hand, the demographic majority in the most popu-
lous corner of the Arabian peninsula and, on the other, entrenched elites 
from a bygone era, anachronistic neighbouring gerontocracies and post-
9/11 American imperialism. Aspirations of the forward-looking youth 
are thwarted not only by an intransigent domestic ruling class seeking 
to preserve the status quo, but also by the larger context of the outmoded 
Saudi-American-Gee 'stability' pact. Neither the unarmed movement 
for domestic political change - blessed with many strong personalities 
but no overall leader - nor the armed conflicts within Yemeni borders 
(the Huthi rebellion, al-Qa'ida jihadis, American and sometimes Saudi 
airstrikes, militant elements of the southern Hiraak, and battles between 
rival elements in the armed forces) can be fully understood in purely 
endogenous terms. Instead, they reflect the profound contradictions of 
the Arabian peninsula between the wealth and passivity of the Gulf and 
Yemen's destitution and chaos. 
This chapter juxtaposes these seemingly two quite different storylines 
- one about Yemeni aspirations for social justice and better governance 
and the other about American and Saudi operations undertaken in the 
name of combating terrorism. The so-called GCC Initiative, and in par-
ticular the National Dialogue Conference process playing out as this book 
goes to press, provides the link between them. From the perspective of 
domestic politics, the Dialogue can be read as the outcome of agitation by 
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the new generation of 'peaceful youth', as well as an outgrowth of Yemen's 
tradition of dialogue - an historic effort to resolve crisis through broad 
negotiation between representatives of various political constituencies. 
In the context of the 'war on terror', however, the GCC Initiative and 
even the donor-sponsored Dialogue among political elites can be seen 
as security-driven or even hegemonic projects on the part of the us and 
its ally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Fed up with three decades of corrupt, venal dictatorship, suffering 
from ecological and economic collapse, and inspired by the uprisings 
that toppled autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt, Yemenis mobilized on an 
unprecedented scale to express their discontent in early 2011 and contin-
ued peacefully to demonstrate for change throughout the year, even as 
dissidents and loyalists within the military waged war on one another, 
and as the president was injured, left the country for treatment and then 
returned. Popular demands were only partly met when Saleh's deputy, 
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, was inaugurated as president on 27 February 
2012, after an election organized by international donors in which he was 
the sole candidate, and only partly addressed by the ambitious National 
Dialogue negotiations. In the meantime, the Obama administration pur-
sued a military strategy of targeted and 'signature' strikes - extra judicial 
assassinations - while paying only perfunctory lip service to Yemenis' 
legitimate political aspirations. 
A CIVIC REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT 
In February 2011, Tawakkul Karman stood on a stage outside Sana'a Uni-
versity, a microphone in one hand and the other clenched defiantly above 
her head, leading a crowd of tens of thousands of cheering, flag-waving 
protesters. On other days and in other cities, other citizens led the chants. 
These mass public performances enacted a veritable civic revolution in 
a south-west Arabia where previous activist surges had never produced 
democratic transitions, but nonetheless did shape national history. Draw-
ing inspiration from the Tunisian and Egyptian examples, as well as from 
home-grown, often localized protest repertoires, activists occupied the 
national commons as never before, animating a public civic renaissance 
with new forms of protest and expression. Women's public participation 
registered seismic sociocultural change. Whether this popular uprising 
- wracked by intra-elite street battles, perverted by proxy petrodollar 
machinations and complicated by American counter-terror operations -
ends in glory or tragedy, its social, psychological and political significance 
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is inestimable. As in Tunisia and Egypt, the experience of collective, 
contentious mobilization 'from below' energized a veritable cultural trans-
formation. Yemen's 'peaceful youth' (shabab al-silmiyya) are the frontline 
of revolution against the status quo in the Arabian peninsula. 
Frustrations in the poorest Arab country had been mounting for years 
on a number of fronts. Patronage was rampant.1 Restlessness stirred around 
the president's clear intention to ordain his son, already commander of 
the nation's Republican Guard, as his successor; postponement of parlia-
mentary elections; widespread unemployment, especially among young 
people; deteriorating standards ofliving for all but the upper echelons of 
the ruling kleptocracy; ecological depredations against a formerly self-
sufficient agricultural economy, resulting in serious environmental damage 
and acute water shortages; abysmal educational and medical facilities, 
sanitation, and physical infrastructure; crude resort to censorship, harass-
ment, arbitrary detention and brutality against journalists, dissidents and 
regime opponents; and profound, widespread malaise. 
By late 2010, regional demonstrations or uprisings had emerged in 
various parts of the country with seemingly various complaints. Most 
dramatically, people in the former PDRY until 1990 formed a movement 
known simply as Hiraak.2 For several years, its supporters had been 
marching and staging displays in the Arabian Sea port city of Aden and 
outlying provinces like Hadhramaut and Abyan.3 The movement revived 
some slogans, motifs and performative elements of the old anti-colonial 
struggle in Aden, Abyan, Dhala', Hadhramaut and other communities 
in what were then known as the British 'Protectorates'. 4 Again, these 
blended Socialist elements with locally distinctive traditions of dance, 
dress and dialect. Hiraak also depended on human rights organizations 
and municipal newspapers established during the opening that followed 
unification in the early nineties. Saleh and his official media could por-
tray their agony as treasonous southern irredentist threats to national 
unity reminiscent of the 1994 civil war. And indeed some citizens flew 
the flag of the old People's Democratic Republic even as others joined 
1 April L. Alley, 'The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen', 
Middle East Journal 64: 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 385-409. 
2 Susanne Dahlgren, 'The Snake with a Thousand Heads: The Southern Cause in 
Yemen', Middle East Report 256 (2010), pp. 28-33. 
3 Stephen Day, 'Updating Yemeni National Unity: Could Lingering Regional Divisions 
Bring Down the Regime?' Middle East Journal 62: 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 417-36. 
4 Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans: A Political Survey of Instability in the Arab 
World (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). 
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the nationalist movement to oust the national regime in Sana'a. Over the 
next couple of years the irredentist element of the Southern movement 
swelled. 5 Moreover, there was a more openly armed rebellion rooted in 
complicated, sometimes counter-intuitive sectarian and tribal frictions 
in the far northern province ofSa'ada, seemingly exacerbated by proxim-
ity to the Saudi border and unquestionably provoked by Wahhabi Saudi 
missionaries' absolutist fundamentalism. 6 
In cities and provinces between these geographical extremes, people 
were disheartened by high-level corruption, nepotism, and favouritism 
towards the president's Hashid tribal confederation and his own family 
members. It turned out that the tribulations of Southerners resonated 
throughout Yemen: the grotesque enrichment of regime cronies at the 
expense of the multitudes; obscenely bad stewardship of the commons; 
the skyrocketing price of meat, staples and even clean water; the lack of 
jobs for college and high school graduates. In a Wikileaked cable, the 
American ambassador had already noted in 2005 that riots prompted 
by the lifting of fuel subsidies possibly presaged a mass revolt, especially 
but not only among the perennially restive tribes of the north-eastern 
provinces of al-Jawf and Mareb, where truckers and pump-farmers con-
sidered cheap fuel their lifeblood.7 Grandiose pageants of presidential 
power, half-truths in the official media, indignities suffered at military 
checkpoints, arbitrary arrests and imprisonments: these and other daily 
insults fed popular alienation, despair and frustration, most notably among 
young people. While a privileged few cooled off in swimming pools in 
their luxury compounds, the water table fell, crippling the agricultural 
economy that remained the livelihood of the rural majority. Farmers and 
ranchers facing starvation flocked to the cities, where water supplies and 
social services were swamped. Misery became the new normal; millions 
barely survived on the equivalent of a dollar or two a day. The economy 
was in a shambles. 8 
Demonstrators took to the streets in large numbers in Sana'a, the 
capital - now a teeming, sprawling, poorly laid out, still picturesque 
5 See the story as told by Peter Salisbury, 'Yemen's Southern Intifada', Foreign Policy, 
Middle East Channel, 13 March 2013, available at mideast.foreignpolicy.com. 
6 Shelagh Weir, 'A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen', Middle East 
Report 204 (1997), pp. 22-6. 
7 Sheila Carapico, 'No Exit: Yemen's Existential Crisis', Middle East Report Online, 3 
May 2011, available at www.merip.org. 
8 Nora A. Colton, 'Yemen: A Collapsed Economy', Middle East Journal 64: 3 (Summer 
2010), pp. 410-26. 
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low-rise city of nearly two million mostly youthful inhabitants who have 
overwhelmed its schools, sewage disposal system and water supplies. 
Home to the ruling family and its security apparatus, Sana'a was also 
most exposed to its excesses and regulations, and was the prime site for 
parades of presidential power. After Saleh loyalists laid claim to Sana'a's 
central Midan al-Tahrir - so that it would not follow Cairo's example of 
becoming a stage for malcontents - students, faculty and other activists 
assembled around the university campus on the western edge of the city. 
They named the space they claimed Change Square ('Midan al-Taghyir'), 
and borrowed North African slogans - Irhal ('Leave!') and al-Sha'ab Yuridh 
Isqat al-Nizam ('The people want the downfall of the regime').9 Occupiers 
mainly represented the demographic bulge of fifteen-to-thirty-year-olds 
who had never known any other leadership: university students, graduates, 
dropouts, and those hoping for a better future. In Change Square and 
adjoining spaces, these 'peaceful youth' performed music and dance and 
held poetry readings, displayed posters and street art, and organized 
collective gestures of defiance like 50,000 pairs of clasped hands held high. 
The call to prayer became a call to civic engagement, and mass prayers a 
form of civil disobedience. The crowds around Sana'a University swelled 
as villagers, farmers and other tribesmen from outlying areas joined the 
protests. Many of them pitched tents that eventually grew into a sprawling 
encampment snaking through the neighbourhood around the university 
campus with its own sanitation, medical services, teach-ins, and food and 
water supplies. As the Yemeni journalist Fare'a al-Muslimi later put it, 
'The tribesman laid down his weapon and came to protest alongside his 
like-minded civilian compatriot, thus achieving voluntarily what years 
of attempts at banning weapons could not.'10 
Interestingly, unlike in Egypt where some imagined that Facebook 
and the internet sparked the revolution, in Yemen Facebook member-
ship, blogs and YouTube posts proliferated from being the preserve, in 
2010, of mere handfuls of the elite with friends abroad to become major 
means of communications a year later. It was a cyber-explosion. While 
thousands joined Facebook during the spring of 2011, others blogged, 
hundreds practised guerrilla photo-journalism, countless numbers began 
to tweet. A montage of photos and video images of Ali Abdullah Saleh set 
9 For a description of the early weeks, see Nir Rosen, 'How it Started in Yemen: From 
Tahrir to Taghyir', Jadaliyya, 18 March 2001, available at www.jadaliyya.com. 
io Fare'a al-Muslimi, 'The Social Transformation Of Yemen's Youth Revolution', 
translated and posted on 14 April 2013 by al-Monitor, available at www.al-monitor. 
com, from an article in al-Safir (Lebanon), 3 April 2013. 
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to the lyrics of Katy Perry's 'Hot 'n' Cold' went viral. Virtual participants 
among Yemeni emigrant communities overseas passed images on. Some 
were picked up by al-Jazeera or analysed from abroad. As in Egypt, how-
ever, for all the talk of a digital revolution, mobile phones were by far the 
most salient piece of technology for domestic communication, and word 
of mouth spread news within and between neighbourhoods. 
Never in the history of the Arabian peninsula had women been so 
politically prominent. Many women besides Karman defied a conserva-
tive cultural norm mandating speaking softly (if at all) in public. Indeed, 
women were in the forefront of the movement for change.11 For instance, 
Amal al-Basha, Samia al-Aghbari, Bushra al-Maqtari, Arwa Othman, 
Jamila Raja, Asmahan al-Allas, Bilqis al-Lahabi and Amat al-Alim Sosowa 
displayed leadership in their cities and towns, on the national stage, on the 
internet and sometimes abroad. On the streets, less famous but even more 
courageous women mocked Saleh's sleazy innuendo about an un-Islamic 
'mixing of the sexes' in protest camps. Almost all Yemeni women wear an 
all-encompassing black robe and veil. At one point many thousands lined 
up on a street in Sana'a, covered in the customary black. One row wore 
white baseball caps on top of their veils, and another sported red base-
ball caps. As they marched, the visual effect was to create a white, black 
and red Yemeni flag stretching more than a kilometre down a wide road 
in a show of patriotism. On another occasion, after a series of attacks on 
female activists by security forces, urban women in Sana'a, still wearing 
their customary all-black robes and veils, staged a particularly Yemeni 
form of protest drawing on rural traditions: they set fire to a pile of mul-
ticoloured head-coverings called maqrama in a symbolic distress signal 
to the tribes. Their pamphlet read: 'This is a plea from the free women of 
Yemen; here we burn our maqrama in front of the world to witness the 
bloody massacres carried out by the tyrant Saleh.' 
The counter-revolution turned violent enough to provoke massive 
defections from the regime after a deadly incident on 18 March 2011, 
when plain-clothes snipers fired from neighbouring rooftops onto Change 
Square, killing more than fifty mostly young and entirely peaceful pro-
testers. In disbelief, fury and sorrow, a record 150,000 marched in Sana'a's 
biggest 'day of rage' so far. 12 There was an avalanche of top- and mid-level 
resignations from the armed forces, the foreign service, the civil service, 
11 Jamila Raja, 'Yemeni Women in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities', paper 
presented at the 'Yemen .. .'conference, Harvard University, October 2012. 
12 Sheila Carapico, 'No Celebration of Yemen's Unity Day', Foreign Policy, Middle East 
Channel, 24 May 2011, available at mideast.foreignpolicy.com. 
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and even the president's General People's Congress in protest at the exces-
sive use of force against unarmed civilians. Key regime insiders, notably 
General Ali Mohsen, the army commander who had dealt mercilessly 
with Southern secessionists in 1994, and leaders of the president's own 
Hashid tribal confederation - including scions of the paramount sheikh 
- turned against Saleh. 13 Even as the regime split, however, collective 
rage and moral panic gradually solidified the protests into a nationwide 
movement. Sentiments crossed party lines, dividing not only the army 
and the Hashid tribe but also the conservative political party. 14 Hence-
forth the intra-regime struggle intensified in the streets of Sana'a and 
other cities, and in jockeying for representation and a voice within the 
National Dialogue that began on the second anniversary of the March 
2011 massacre. While the GCC 'deal' was under negotiation, protesters in 
al-Baidha, Ibb, Aden and other cities and towns cried for Saleh's prosecu-
tion in an international court. 
Instead of taking sides in intra-regime struggles, most people wanted 
them all to disappear from the political scene. Demonstrators in Sana'a 
and Ta'iz adopted the slogans 'Remaining Peaceful is Our Choice' and 
'Peaceful, Peaceful, No to Civil War'. The Coordinating Council of the 
Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC) issued a thirteen-point 'youth plan' 
in March, and later a 65-page 'Youth Vision forthe Future of Yemen', both 
emphasizing concerns for justice and non-violence. 15 Protests swelled; 
multitudes massed. In Ta'iz, a bustling commercial and industrial city 
nestled in the verdant southern mountains of the former YAR, and the 
picturesque neighbouring city oflbb, simmering discontent erupted. This 
populous 'middle region', a once rich agricultural zone tilled by peas-
ants and sharecroppers, served as a bridge of sorts between the Southern 
Hiraak and Sana'a's Change Square; some called Ta'iz the epicentre of 
the popular uprising. The city's relatively educated, cosmopolitan student 
body entertained demonstration participants with music, skits, carica-
tures, graffiti, banners and other artistic embellishments. Throngs were 
photographed: men and women together, men and women separately, all 
13 For the background to this feud, see Sarah Phillips, 'Foreboding About the Future 
in Yemen', Middle East Report Online, 3 April 2006, available at www.merip.org. 
14 Analysis of the background to the ideological divisions within Isiah is available in 
Stacey Philbrick Yadav, 'Segmented Publics and Islamist Women in Yemen: Rethink-
ing Space and Activism', Journal of Middle Eastern Women's Studies 6: 2 (2010), pp. 
I-30. 
15 Atiaf Zaid Alwazir, "'Youth" Inclusion in Yemen: a Necessary Element for 
Success of Political Transition', Arab Reform Brief 64 (December 2012), available at 
www.arab-reform.net. 
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unarmed. On 30 October 2011, to cite one small example, women in Ta'iz 
posted a YouTube video full of flowers, confetti, balloons, music and ulu-
lation commemorating each martyr to the revolution. Some weeks later, 
thousands of people trekked nearly 200 kilometres from Ta'iz to Sana'a. 
Ta'iz-Sana'a youth march, December 2011. © Ridan Bahran 
Young people and parents in al-Hodeida, the steamy Red Sea port where 
African-Yemenis suffer exceptional rates of poverty and political disen-
franchisement, filled their own Freedom Square with banners and chants 
and insurrectionary wall-art. Irhal! ('Go!'), they yelled; and, referring to 
the deposed Tunisian leader who had found refuge in Saudi Arabia: 'Oh, 
Ali Abdullah, join bin Ali in Riyadh!' They applauded Mubarak's resig-
nation, celebrated the demise of Libya's dictator Muammar al-Qadhafi, 
and dedicated mass prayers to the martyrs of Syria. New mantras, skits 
and cartoons taunted Yemeni and Syrian dictators: 'Come on Ali, come 
on Bashar, it's time for you to go!' 
The wide-open, semi-arid and sparsely populated plateaus and moun-
tains north, north-west, east and somewhat south of Sana'a are landscapes 
that look like the American south-west. Tribes in this region are not 
unlike American cowboys or hillbillies: they raise livestock, drive pick-
up trucks, carry firearms (in Yemen's tribal heartland, Kalashnikovs or 
even bazooka-launchers) and perennially harbour deep mistrust of the 
central government. In these regions, especially in the far eastern gov-
ernorates of al-Jawf and Mareb, protests took the familiar form of acts 
of civil disobedience such as road blockages and commercial stoppages. 
Yet in al-Baidha province, just north of the former inter-Yemeni border, 
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tribesmen who rarely leave home without a rifle threw down their guns to 
march peacefully. Again, this was highly significant: in a country known 
to be awash with personal weapons, the mass uprising avoided guerrilla 
warfare or military insurrection. In short: tribesmen with the means to 
launch an armed revolt resisted the temptation to open fire. 
COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES 
The regime showed no such restraint. Divisions loyal to the president, 
mostly commanded by immediate members of his family, fired on unarmed 
demonstrators in Sana'a, Aden, Ta'iz, Hodeida and the countryside. Hun-
dreds of deaths and thousands of injuries stoked rather than quelled 
discontent, however. Grainy, graphic cell-phone footage was uploaded to 
the internet. In many communities each funeral provoked more angry 
or grief-stricken dissenters to call for Saleh's downfall. 
More explosively, after 18 March, loyalists and dissidents engaged one 
another in mortal combat, especially in certain neighbourhoods of Sana'a 
where Saleh's family commands, including the Republican Guards and 
Special Forces trained and equipped by the US, battled the renegade bri-
gade led by General Ali Mohsen and Hashid tribal militia headed by the 
sons of the late great Hashid Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar. Both the general 
and the sheikh had been part of the Saleh regime for three decades. In 
other words, powerful elements of the president's inner circle had turned 
against him. At various times Saleh labelled them blood-thirsty, seditious, 
traitors, coup-makers, terrorists and thugs. General Ali Mohsen placed 
an armed cordon around the large neighbourhood surrounding Change 
Square to protect the protesters. There were frequent skirmishes around 
the al-Ahmar family compound on the airport road. The explosion in 
the mosque within the presidential compound that left Saleh disfigured 
and killed or crippled several of his deputies was almost certainly some 
kind of inside job.16 This was an intra-regime squabble, among members 
of the same tribe. The 'peaceful youth', al-shabab al-silmiyya, did not line 
up behind the general or the sons of the late Sheikh al-Ahmar. Outsid-
ers characterizing these events as 'tribal conflicts' or 'youth riots' were 
emphatically wrong. 
To protect his positions around the capital, and perhaps to deliberately 
unleash zealous militants, Saleh withdrew government forces from parts 
16 Sarah Phillips, 'Who Tried to Kill Ali Abdallah Saleh? The Hidden Feud Behind the 
Revolution in Yemen', Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, 16 June 2011, available at 
www.foreignpolicy.com. 
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of the old PDRY, especially Abyan and its provincial capital, Zinjibar. No 
more than a couple of hundred Islamist fighters, many of them foreign, 
were able to overrun civilian officials there and in some other towns. 
This strange twisting of the main plot attracted American attention, and 
firepower was directed against al-Qa'ida; Saleh even managed to turn 
this to his advantage, presenting himself as a reliable ally for the us and 
Saudi Arabia against militant Islamists. Washington increased military 
assistance, and the regime seemed to benefit. The battles for Zinjibar and 
other towns abandoned by Saleh's forces, including aerial attacks that 
caused physical damage and civilian casualties, in turn fanned Southern 
rage against Sana'a; the government, locals felt, was not protecting them 
either from the jihadists or from missile strikes. Exiled Southern leaders, 
notably Ali Salim al-Beedh - the former vice president of unified Yemen 
who led the failed secessionist war in 1994 - called for a restoration of 
Southern sovereignty. 
The hegemon of the Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, was ever-fearful of chaos 
or revolutionary change in poverty-stricken, crisis-riven Yemen.17 In May 
2011 the kingdom and the other oil monarchies in the GCC working with 
Saleh's government, and the diverse but entrenched parliamentary oppo-
sition in the Joint Meeting Parties, announced - over the heads of the 
protest movement - a plan whereby Saleh would relinquish presidential 
power in exchange for immunity from prosecution for him and his fam-
ily. Saleh stalled and prevaricated for months, even after being severely 
injured in the attack on his compound in June 2011 and airlifted to top-
of-the-line hospitals in Saudi Arabia and then the United States. The us 
and other Western powers joined the GCC in offering rhetorical support 
for this novel plan for a managed transition. During Saleh's three-month 
convalescence abroad, his son and nephews in the top military com-
mands took aim at their allies-turned-rivals. Military and civilian deaths 
mounted. Electricity and fuel supplies waned. City life became even more 
intolerable. 
By all accounts, the us ambassador and visiting American military 
officials were actively talking with all parties to the armed conflict between 
Saleh and his former colleagues, seeking to quell the street battles that 
disrupted life in the capital during 2011. Yet the international commu-
nity did not press publicly for a ceasefire or threaten sanctions against 
the Saleh regime. The human rights minister, Houria Mashhour, tweeted: 
'We were expecting a stronger attitude from the Gee countries towards 
17 Bernard Haykel, 'Saudi Arabia's Yemen Dilemma: How to Manage an Unruly State', 
Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2011, available at www.foreignaffairs.com. 
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the crimes committed against the Yemeni people, but we are extremely 
disappointed to see the meeting between [Saudi] King Abdullah and 
Saleh.' On 21 October the Security Council of the United Nations issued 
an ambiguous, toothless resolution - 2014 - condemning human rights 
violations by 'the government and other actors' and calling for 'all sides' 
to commit to a peaceful power transition in accordance with the GCC for-
mula. Yemen's official Saba press agency enthused that Saleh 'welcomed' 
the resolution; Tawakkul Karman, in a comment piece for the Guardian 
on 1 November expressed dismay. 
At a ceremony in the Saudi capital on 23 November 2011, witnessed 
by Gulf royalty and some Western diplomats - but none of the Yemenis 
who had called for his removal - a smiling Saleh finally affixed his 
signature to four copies of the GCC plan. Vice President Abd Rabbuh 
Mansur Hadi, a native of South Yemen who had been acting president 
during Saleh's convalescence, resumed that role. After a hastily arranged 
but uncontested ballot on 21 February 2012, he assumed the office of 
president. The daunting economic, social, political and security prob-
lems facing the country were laid at his feet. Instead of the downfall of 
a regime, this represented only a rearrangement of it. The ceremony 
symbolized the influence of the Gulf monarchs in Yemen. Soon after, 
donors pledged aid to address the daunting humanitarian, economic 
and security problems facing the country, as well as to facilitate the 
National Dialogue. 18 
Many activists were frustrated by the Gee plan's immunity provisions 
and the one-candidate 'vote' for Hadi, which was itself a concession to 
Saleh's insistence that he would only leave office 'by ballot'. These terms 
were negotiated between the president and his long-time patrons in the 
wealthy Gulf kingdoms over the heads of the protesters, and with only 
marginal consultation with the multiparty political leadership in the Joint 
Meeting Parties of the parliamentary opposition. According to Atiaf Zaid 
Alwazir, it was 'a byproduct of political negotiations that excluded the vast 
majority on the street', leading to power grabs that shifted 'priorities for 
reform away from comprehensive social changes that were the demands 
of the revolutionary movement'. 19 
The National Dialogue was relatively more inclusive, and it drew on 
indigenous precedents for high-level negotiation in times of national 
18 For analysis of the challenges as of early 2013, see Helen Lackner, 'Yemen: 
Where Is the Transition Heading?'. Open Democracy, 12 March 2013, available at 
www.opendemocracy.net. 
19 Alwazir, '"Youth" Inclusion in Yemen', p. 5. 
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emergency. Both South and North Yemen held mass conferences during 
the political transitions in the 1960s, during which some constitutional 
principles for post-colonial and post-Imamic regimes, respectively, were 
hammered out. A more direct and immediate precedent was the National 
Dialogue of Political Forces that had convened in 1994 in the hope of 
resolving the power struggle between Sana'a and Aden. Along with mass 
conferences in various parts of the country during 1993and1994, this Dia-
logue produced a Document of Pledge and Accord embraced by a wide 
segment of the political elite, even though it failed to prevent the outbreak 
of a civil war in which Saleh's forces effectively conquered the secessionist 
bid from former PDRY forces led by Ali Salim al-Beedh. 
In consultations between the UN special envoy Jamal Benomar, the 
ruling General People's Congress (GPC) party and the Joint Meeting Parties 
(JMP), and in response to calls from women leaders, the 2013 National 
Dialogue Committee comprised 565 representatives of various factions, 
constituencies and regions. Unsurprisingly, aging male politicians from 
the GPC and the JMP - including veterans of the conferences in the sixties 
and the Dialogue in the nineties, and including Islamists, Socialists and 
various Arab nationalists - won the majority of seats at the bargaining 
table; .the 'youth' group was allotted only forty positions. However - in 
an innovation undoubtedly pushed by the United Nations, proposed by 
prominent female and feminist activists, and supported by Socialists, many 
Southerners, and the youth contingent, against the conservative misogynist 
military incumbents in Sana'a - the rules accepted by all parties called for 
30 per cent of delegates to be women. This was significant because they were 
women, but also because they came mostly from the 'middle generation' 
and the ranks of professionals and technocrats. They quickly rose to 
leadership in some of the Dialogue's nine subcommittees, including the 
difficult assignments dealing with the Huthi and Southern questions. On 
the other hand, some high-profile politicians - including several Southern 
separatists, a scion of Hashid's sheikhly al-Ahmar family, and Tawakkul 
Karman - declined their appointments unless or until specific ultimatums 
were met; some resigned only to return later. Old elites in and beyond the 
GPC positioned themselves to guard their longstanding prerogatives; Saleh 
and his male kinfolk remained on the scene, conniving to outmanoeuvre 
their many enemies. Much of this was politics and political bargaining as 
usual. Nonetheless, the combination of the historical memories of some 
male elders, the energy of many women andyoungpeople, and the financial 
and moral support of international donors infused the process with some 
positive energy and momentum. To some scholars and pundits observing 
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from afar the events in Yemen - alongside the absurd constitution-making 
in post-Mubarak Egypt and the abject bloodletting between Assad loyalists 
and armed militia in Syria - the National Dialogue Conference presented 
a hopeful, potentially fruitful path. 
While this was going on, however, ordinary families were suffer-
ing. Most Yemenis were not following the Dialogue. In almost every 
community, power cuts were a daily occurrence. Poverty was spreading. 
Water tables were dropping. Jobs were scarce. Alongside the Dialogue 
process, protests and new forms of political expression continued, and 
continued to evolve. The Coordinating Council of the Youth Revolu-
tion of Change remained active even after announcing the formal end 
of its camp-out. Mural painters, bloggers, videographers, journalists, 
performing artists and others found new creative outlets. A media-savvy 
group of young people in Sana'a calling themselves 'Support Yemen' 
posted some YouTube videos, including one featuring interviews with 
peasants more concerned with food than with the 'National Dialogue'. 
Wounded protesters, dark-skinned 'marginalized' Yemenis and other 
groups staged sit-ins or other public events. Human rights groups docu-
mented violence, disappearances and arbitrary arrests. They added to 
their list of concerns air attacks supposedly aimed at al-Qa'ida suspects. 
Bushra al-Maqtari, the feminist, Socialist youth leader from Ta'iz, who 
was honoured in April 2013 in Washington, took advantage of the visit 
to meet with American anti-drone activists there. In July 2012, human 
rights minister Houria Mashhour and several members of the Dialogue 
committee joined a hunger strike at Sana'a's Central Prison demanding 
the release of youth activists arrested during demonstrations a year or 
two earlier. In Aden, Mukalla and other Southern cities and towns, mass 
rallies continued to attract throngs of people, many of them supporting 
calls for separation. 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 
Yemen's 'peaceful youth' uprising intersected with power politics in the 
international arena, and in particular with a globalized American mili-
tary-security policy; in the meantime, the United States and Saudi Arabia 
had stepped up their coordinated, secretive counter-terrorism campaign 
against the Yemen-based branch of al-Qa'ida - which, in turn, seemed 
emboldened. 
Despite its intensifying involvement, the United States did not for-
mulate a Yemen policy or even a genuinely diplomatic mission there. 
Instead, it clung to a policy of keeping the Saudi monarchy secure and 
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happy, and a related counter-terrorism policy expanding the scope of 
the post-9/11 '.Af-Pak' strategy. Washington regarded Yemen as a theatre 
of counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia's backyard, as if it were not a real 
place where real people demanded decent governance, justice and the 
possibility of raising families with dignity, education and health. The 
Obama administration paid scant attention to these widespread popular 
concerns. us ambassador Gerald Feierstein, who many Yemenis saw as 
a major power-broker and who some called 'the Sheikh [or sometimes 
the Emir] of Yemen', was tapped for his counter-terrorism credentials 
as well as his diplomatic experience. He worked closely with intelligence 
and military officers. During the protracted negotiations to facilitate the 
presidential transition, Washington's envoy was a CIA veteran, then deputy 
national security advisor for homeland security and counter-terrorism, 
John 0. Brennan - not someone with a State Department career or who 
had the ear of Hillary Clinton. Engagement in Yemen's transition was not 
a diplomatic mission, but part and parcel of security operations. Instead 
of providing material or even moral support to activists clamouring for 
social justice - much less calling for competitive elections or women's 
rights - Obama, Clinton, Brennan and Feierstein sought to placate Riyadh. 
American attention fixated on battling an enemy Americans like to call 
al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - often said, sensationally 
and somewhat misleadingly, to constitute a grave threat to the American 
homeland.20 Al-Qa'ida's local commanders and spokespersons revelled 
in publicity that helped recruit scores or even hundreds of jihadi wan-
nabes from within, and especially beyond, Yemen. As is well known, 
al-Qa'ida's declared mission in the Arabian peninsula is to dislodge the 
American military from the kingdom; jihadists were drawn to Yemen 
because of its proximity to Saudi Arabia. 
Most of the more than fifty recorded air attacks inside Yemen in 2012 
were known or supposed, if never acknowledged, to have been launched 
by Americans. A dramatic airstrike in September 2012 near Rada', a his-
torically distinguished but flyblown town in al-Baidha province where 
rogue al-Qa'ida militants had encamped, exterminated three children 
and nine other civilians. 21 Around Rada', where armed tribesmen left 
2° For an expert military analysis of the history and operations of AQAP that sheds 
light on this narrative, see James Spencer, 'Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula: MOS 
and Deductions', Small Wars Journal, 19 August 2011, available at smallwarsjournal. 
com. 
21 Letta Taylor, 'Anatomy of an Air Attack Gone Wrong', Foreign Policy, 26 December 
2012, available at www.foreignpolicy.com. 
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their Kalashnikovs at home to demonstrate peacefully, the maddening 
overhead buzz of drones reminded everyone of American surveillance. 
On 24 December two attacks purportedly launched by the CIA or the 
Defense Department killed five suspected militants in al-Baidha gover-
norate and Hadhramaut. After several more hits and constant fly-overs 
in the next ten days or so, dozens of tribesmen carried their rifles with 
them to a sit-in in front of a government building in Rada', convened to 
complain about Sana'a's authorization of these attacks. Later in Janu-
ary, tribesmen in Mareb stopped traffic after two drone strikes. Attacks 
on targets in Hadhramaut, Abyan and other Southern governorates 
increasingly enraged citizens of the South against a Sana'a government 
authorizing foreign attacks on Yemeni soil, adding to simmering ten-
sions there. 
There were more drone or fixed-wing salvos in an ongoing battle since 
the 2002 strike in retaliation for the bombing of the uss Cole in Aden har-
bour in 2000, in which an American citizen, Ahmed Hijazi, had died. In 
the last days of 2009, Obama authorized bombing that left at least twenty 
children and a dozen women dead in the southern town of al-Majalla, 
along with one militant. In May 2010 a tribal mediator, a Yemeni official 
and other civilians lost their lives in a misguided cruise missile attack. 
By the time Yemen's revolutionary movement began in earnest, several 
high-profile al-Qa'ida operatives and a number of innocent civilians had 
been blown to smithereens by Hellfire missiles. On 30 September 2011 
the American-born Anwar Nasir al-Awlaqi, a firebrand preacher accused 
of inspiring the Fort Hood shootings and the failed attempt to blow up 
a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines plane, was killed, while both the 
American Fort Hood shooter and the Nigerian arrested in Detroit awaited 
trial in the US; several weeks later, al-Awlaqi's teenage son was also struck 
dead. When even American citizens are not given due trial before execu-
tion, the us cannot claim to be standing for the rule oflaw. 
The us h:>..d become thoroughly but haphazardly engaged in the south-
western portion of the Arabian peninsula. In addition to endless aerial 
surveillance and frequent bombardments, measures to 'stabilize' Yemen 
now included provision of light aircraft, armed vehicles, gadgetry and 
training; direct military cooperation with and command-and-control 
backing for Yemeni forces; coordination of the restructuring of Yemen's 
military command and the military subcommittee of the National Dia-
logue; some humanitarian assistance, and token support for civil society 
initiatives; and extra coordination with Saudi security institutions to 
make sure that Yemen's multiple conflicts did not spill across the border. 
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There was also some evidence of launch-pads for unmanned Predator 
drones and/or Hellfire missiles at al-Anad Airbase, near Aden, and per-
haps another us base in the eastern Hadhramaut desert. 22 
In addition to the remote-controlled 'targeted' attacks purportedly 
conducted by the Defense Department or the CIA, there were so-called 
'signature strikes' that do not aim at individuals identified by intelligence 
agencies as enemies of the US. Instead, 'signature strikes' are robotic attacks 
triggered by evidence of 'suspicious activities' or 'patterns of movement' 
observed by electronic drones from the air, such as the loading of rifles onto 
pickup trucks. 23 The Obama administration's 'signature strikes' directive 
deemed any able-bodied men in the line of fire legitimate targets unless 
they were posthumously exonerated. This shoot-first-ask-questions-later 
policy was the very antithesis of applying the rule oflaw. Although lethal 
targeted attacks - especially those against American citizens - under-
standably attracted the most attention, signature attacks provoked even 
more outrage. In a well-armed country like Yemen, the presence of rifles 
or even bazookas or rocket-propelled grenade launchers does not in itself 
identify nearby individuals as terrorists. Nor do weapons in the hands 
of Yemenis pose a credible threat to the American homeland. The more 
immediate menace was to Saudi Arabia. 
American military policies were patently contrary to the pursuit of jus-
tice, respect for human rights and cultivation of the rule oflaw in Yemen. 
The outspoken human rights minister, Houria Mashhour, told a Reuters 
correspondent that she would prefer to handle terror suspects through 
the judiciary, in a way that did not violate human rights or risk civilian 
casualties. 'All we are calling for is justice and reliance on international 
regulations with regard to human rights and to be true to our commit-
ment to our citizens in that they all deserve a fair trial', she added. 24 The 
American-educated youth activist Fare'a al-Muslimi told a us Congres-
sional hearing in April 2013 that attacks such as the one that had killed 
five people in his home village in Dhamar governorate were spreading 
intense anti-Americanism. For these two and many other supporters of 
22 Sheila Carapico, 'The Laryngitic Dog', Middle East Report Online, 14 February 2013, 
available at www.merip.org. 
23 Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and David J. Callen, 'Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fos-
tering Emirates through Counterterrorism?' Middle East Policy Council, Journal 
Essay, 2013, available at www.mepc.org. The Bureau for Investigative Journalism's 
website keeps a running tally of documented strikes at www.thebureauinvestigates. 
com. 
2 4 Mahmoud Habboush, 'Yemen Minister Urges Ground Ops, Not Drones, against 
Militants', Reuters, 22 January 2013. 
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the uprising, opposition to us military policy had become part of the 
struggle for social justice. 
Long known for meddling in Yemen's domestic politics, Riyadh had 
many worries there: the Shi' a Huthi rebellion on the kingdom's south-
ern frontier, which the Saudis blame on Iran; al-Qa'ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula, based in Yemen since militants had been chased out of Saudi 
Arabia; the popular 'youth' uprising calling for democracy; the risk of 
chaos and/or full-fledged civil war in the Peninsula's south-west quad-
rant; and the very prospect of a strong, unified, mobilized country where 
democratic values and women's empowerment might be on the rise. In 
the face of popular demonstrations of an order of magnitude that had 
toppled dictators in Tunisia and Egypt, the kingdom sought to maintain 
its traditional influence in Yemen through the patronage system of pay-
ments to various Yemeni political actors in and beyond Sana'a's central 
government, overseen by the Saudi Ministry of Interior. 25 
Although air strikes are usually attributed to the United States, evi-
dence indicates Saudi involvement in some operations. In 2010, Amnesty 
International said it was 'extremely likely' - though difficult to verify -
that Tornado fighter-bombers supplied by the UK to Saudi Arabia were 
used in indiscriminate attacks against Huthi rebels that killed civilians as 
well as militants.26 The Guardian suggested that some deadly bombings of 
Yemen were 'outsourced' to the Saudi Air Force.27 The internet was abuzz 
with claims that Saudi fighter jets had conducted operations in Yemen 
in early 2013. Investigative journalists found evidence of an undisclosed 
American drone base in Saudi Arabia from which the attack that had killed 
al-Awlaqi was launched.28 Perhaps the House of Saud was outsourcing its 
al-Qa'ida problem to the us military, rather than the other way around. 
Washington supports the House of Saud, but the monarchy is wary 
of Yemeni aspirations for social justice. As the National Dialogue was 
progressing, the kingdom expelled tens of thousands of Yemeni migrant 
workers or small entrepreneurs as part of an effort to tighten immigration, 
25 Bernard Haykel, 'Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution', Washington, 
Center for International and Strategic Studies, Middle East Program Gulf Analysis 
Paper, February 2013; Stig Stenslie, 'Not Too Strong, Not Too Weak: Saudi Arabia's 
Policy Towards Yemen', Norwegian Peacebuilding Policy Centre, Policy Brief, March 
2013, available at www.peacebuilding.no. 
26 'Amnesty Links British Jets to Saudi Attacks in Yemen', Guardian, 24 August 2010. 
27 Lakshman Menon, 'America Outsources Yemen Qaeda Fight to Saudi Arabia', Sun-
day Guardian, 14 March 2013, available at www.sunday-guardian.com. 
2 8 Mark Mazzetti, Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, 'How a us Citizen Came to Be in 
America's Cross Hairs', New York Times, 9 March 2013. 
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curb smuggling and 'Saudize' the labour force. Work was begun on an 
1,800-kilometre security fence along the Saudi border with Yemen, com-
plete with massive guard towers; a Yemeni pundit, Haykal Bafana, tweeted 
to the effect that 'at least an effective barrier might stem the flow of jihadis 
from Saudi Arabia into Yemen'. Official and personal-account payments 
from the oil-rich Gee countries to military commanders, politicians, 
tribal sheikhs and other figures continued in a fifty-year-old pattern, 
while new actors probably including Iran and Qatar also got into the 
act. Furthermore while Yemeni women spoke up, led chants for regime 
change, performed liberation theatre, campaigned against violence and 
took leadership roles in the National Dialogue, the Custodians of Mecca 
and Medina continued to restrict women's right to drive, ride bicycles, 
travel abroad or otherwise constitute themselves as functioning adults. 
On this front, supposedly backward Yemen put the kingdom and its Gee 
cousins to shame. Likewise, the Gulf monarchs' antipathy towards the 
Arab revolutions and aversion to democratization were hardly a secret. 
Riyadh had a sometimes counter-intuitive, convoluted history of backing 
the Zaydi-Shi'a imamate against Yemeni republicans in the 1960s, Salafi 
jihadists in the interim and Socialist secessionists in 1994. Historically, 
the kingdom has consistently sought to thwart Yemeni nationalism, self-
determination, unity, welfare, poverty alleviation, workers' rights, women's 
empowerment and democratization. Since 2002, Saudi and American 
policies have been overwhelmingly concerned with the fight against al-
Qa'ida, and this drove their Yemen policies which were, in turn, largely 
strategic. A decade later, they also worried about Iranian influence on 
the Huthi movement. Strategic realpolitik made good sense from both 
Riyadh's and Washington's point of view, but was not attentive to the con-
sequences of building up Saleh's military machine, nor to the mounting 
frustrations of the Yemeni people. Lastly, then, us policy is largely con-
cerned with supporting the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - a 
priority that conflicts with the prospects of democratization in Yemen. 
Many Yemenis question whether key foreign players and neighbouring 
governments appreciate the extent of popular discontent and the depth 
of the desire for change. Arranged under tight security at the five-star 
Sana'a Movenpik, or occasionally in similarly luxurious facilities in other 
cities, the work of the National Dialogue Conference seems far removed 
from the everyday concerns of the other twenty-five million Yemenis, 
nearly half of whom are undernourished. The naming of the whole pro-
cess as a 'ace Initiative' (rather than a Yemeni Initiative); the direct and 
dominant role of the us in military restructuring; the flood of 'foreign 
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experts' some Yemeni intellectuals refer to as 'tourists' - all of these con-
tributed to perceptions that the Dialogue had been commandeered by 
international donors more interested in protecting their own interests 
than in transitional justice. 
EARLY IN THE SECOND DECADE of the twenty-first century, Yemen is in a 
state of flux. After over three decades of corrupt, incompetent leadership 
in Sana'a and violence and uncertainty in the former PDRY, the vanguard 
of a new generation who had known no other form of rule seized the 
initiative. Women raised their voices, and many men laid down their 
arms. Together, some millions of citizens in cities and towns from the 
Saudi border to the Indian Ocean, and from the Red Sea to the Empty 
Quarter, staked their claim to the public civic sphere: they seized not only 
the streets and plazas, but also cyberspace. They confronted the counter-
revolutionary defenders of the status quo ante: first, the old men who had 
ruled and ruined Yemen since the i96os; second, and indirectly, both their 
foreign backers and spoilers in the neighbouring petro-monarchies and 
the American security establishment. 
The experiment of the National Dialogue Conference deserves to 
be seen as a Yemeni initiative drawing on indigenous precedents and 
activism, and thus as a possible avenue towards a new, negotiated social 
contract between regions, parties and stakeholders in a pluralistic and 
decentralized polity. At the same time, the GCC Initiative also needs to 
be understood as a Western-backed effort by wealthy, misogynistic and 
distinctly anti-democratic gerontocracies to tame popular energies, partly 
by co-opting key elites into a process of managed political change and 
security restructuring. 
It is important to note that both of these different readings offer the 
potential to reduce or avert armed conflict. In the best-case scenario, 
negotiations between various Yemeni forces and interested foreign par-
ties could put the Huthi rebellion to rest, prevent a replay in 2014 of 
the 1994 civil war, and perhaps even eliminate the presence of Yemeni 
and especially foreign al-Qa'ida operatives in the country - thus, with 
any luck, removing the perceived need for American and/or Saudi air-
strikes. The atrocious bloodletting in Syria, Egypt's haphazard top-down 
post-Mubarak constitutional revisions, and the ignominious example of 
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gunpoint regime change in Iraq all tend to point to Yemen as a positive 
model. Yemen deserves credit for drawing on its tradition of dialogue to 
draw representative elites into a national conversation. The role of rich 
neighbours and Western powers should also be acknowledged for facili-
tating talks rather than (or perhaps just in addition to) simply bankrolling 
clients. Something good might come from the Dialogue; prospects for 
disaster might be foreclosed. 
By the same token, there is a world of difference between pursuing 
justice and supporting a securitized 'rule of law'. If the Gee Initiative 
and the National Dialogue are to be deemed a success, they will need 
to deliver more than the professionalization of Yemen's military and 
security forces under new commands whose primary mission is to pro-
tect the us and the ace from al-Qa'ida. International donors recognize 
that Yemen faces many daunting humanitarian, environmental, social, 
legal and political challenges that need to be addressed if a modicum of 
security is to be achieved. Dozens of development agencies are pursuing 
large and small projects in these and other fields. Yet security spending 
- including both direct military expenditures and security assistance -
dwarfs all other forms of foreign aid and investment, because the two 
most influential foreign actors regard Yemen mainly as a battlefield in the 
global war on terror. These heavy expenditures do not meet the needs of 
starving millions for economic relief, the pleas of the 'peaceful youth' for 
demilitarization, or human rights concerns about extrajudicial executions. 
Instead, military actions and involvement, as well as weapons transfers, 
have provoked widespread mistrust of American motives and alienated 
some of the country's most articulate political activists. To the extent that 
the ace Initiative is perceived by the public as a donor project aimed at 
stability rather than a Yemeni project for social justice, it runs the risk 
of minimizing rather than maximizing prospects for democratization. 
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